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EXPRESSIVISM AND DISPOSITIONAL DESIRES
Caj Strandberg

According to a persistent objection against metaethical expressivism, this view is committed to a strong version of internalism which is unable to account for cases where a person’s moral judgment and motivation come apart. Recently, leading expressivists have argued that they can meet this objection by maintaining that moral judgments consist in non-cognitive states that motivate in normal conditions. In this paper, it is maintained that an important dimension of internalism has, on the whole, gone unnoticed: Internalist claims vary depending on whether moral judgments and motivation are understood as dispositional states or occurrent states. This variation can be invoked in an argument showing that expressivists are indeed committed to versions of internalism that make it impossible to account for cases in which moral judgment and motivation diverge. 

1. EXPRESSIVISM AND INTERNALISM
In contemporary metaethics, it is standardly maintained that, in virtue of their conventional meaning, moral sentences express mental states, where different metaethical views characterize such states differently.​[1]​ A moral sentence of the type “I ought to ” has a conventional meaning which is determined by the various terms which constitute its parts. If a person genuinely asserts or accepts such a sentence, it is plausible to assume that she is in a certain state of mind which corresponds to the meaning of the sentence. Consequently, if she utters the sentence under these circumstances, it is legitimate to assume that she is in this mental state. In the metaethical literature, the mental state in question is often referred to as a “moral judgment,” although other labels might be more appropriate.​[2]​ According to expressivism, a sentence of the type “I ought to ” expresses a moral judgment in the form of a non-cognitive state in relation to ing.​[3]​ There are presumably different types of non-cognitive states, but the most significant one is thought to consist in desires broadly conceived. Consequently, expressivism is standardly understood as the view that moral sentences express some kind of desires.​[4]​
It is generally assumed that expressivists embrace internalism according to which there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In the expressivist account, moral judgments consist of non-cognitive states, in the form of desires, in relation to actions.​[5]​ Further, desires to perform actions consist in mental states that are inherently motivating.​[6]​ It is therefore very natural for expressivists to combine their view with internalism. Indeed, one of the main attractions of expressivism is that it makes it possible to account for our notion that, at least generally, a person who judges that she ought to  is motivated to . A fundamental motive for maintaining expressivism, in other words, is that it can explain the very close link between people’s moral judgments about their own actions and their motivation to perform these actions. This also provides a reason to understand expressivism as the view that moral judgments consist in desires, since such mental states have the indicated connection with motivation. Consequently, expressivists standardly embrace internalism and it is often taken for granted that expressivism entails this view.
Now, consider:
 
Unconditional Internalism (UI): Necessarily, for any action  and person S, if S judges that she ought to , then S is motivated to .​[7]​

It is commonly observed in metaethics that a person might judge that she ought to  without being motivated to  if she suffers from a mental condition such as addiction, apathy, compulsion, depression, or some form of emotional disturbance.​[8]​ Given this, an expressivist commitment to UI would be problematic. 
A common internalist response to this argument is to retreat to a weaker claim:

Conditional Internalism (CI): Necessarily, for any action  and person S in conditions C, if S judges that she ought to , then S is motivated to .

A recent, influential way of defending expressivism against the objection to UI just mentioned has been to adopt a version of CI referring to “normal conditions.” The following passages from Allan Gibbard are representative:

[I] do want to admit that in depressed or abnormal states of mind, the dictates of normative governance might be rendered totally ineffective motivationally. That’s still consistent with the rest of what I want to say: that normative judgments are best characterized by their logical ties to a state that is normally motivating […]. [I]n normal states of mind, I’m saying, I don’t sincerely believe that a kind of act is wrong if I have no tendency to feel guilty upon performing actions of that kind.​[9]​

What, though, of […] motivational judgment internalism: that if you think you ought to do it right now, you’ll be motivated to do it at least to some degree? You may not be of one mind to do it, but you’ll be of some mind, at least, to do it. Aren’t there clear counterexamples to this? I’m convinced that I ought to, but cowed and drained as I am, I find no inclination whatsoever to do so. […] [Gibbard’s response to this objection:] A state of mind wouldn’t amount to planning if it weren’t of a kind that normally plays the right systematic role in leading to action. Otherwise, it’s at most going through the motions of planning. It doesn’t follow that at every moment, whatever your inhibitions and however abnormal you are in your responses, you tend to do what you plan to do. Like things, I now say, go for ought judgments: a state of mind isn’t a judgment of ought all told if it isn’t a state that normally issues in action.​[10]​

Simon Blackburn and other expressivists argue in a similar manner.​[11]​ According to this line of argument, expressivists can deal with cases in which moral judgment and motivation come apart by adopting a version of internalism which makes reference to normal conditions.​[12]​ A person’s judgment to the effect that she ought to  consists in a desire of a certain kind which normally issues in motivation to , but when the conditions are not normal because the person is, for instance, depressed, she need not be motivated to . Clearly, it will be an important task for expressivists to explain what is meant by “normal conditions,” and in such a way that the internalist claim does not become trivial, but, unfortunately, expressivists have not addressed this issue with the seriousness it merits.​[13]​ However, this problem will not be the main focus in what follows. 

2. A DISTINCTION IN MIND
Admittedly, it might be possible to interpret this defense of expressivism in slightly different ways. However, it seems highly plausible to understand it as making use of a well-known distinction in philosophy of action. On this construal, there is a distinction between a moral judgment, understood as a state of mind that is “normally motivating,” and manifestations of it in the form of motivation which is instantiated in normal conditions. This is an example of the standard distinction between two different ways of conceiving of a mental state: as a dispositional state, which might be activated in the form of a corresponding occurrent state if certain conditions are satisfied, and as such an occurrent state. This distinction can be made in connection with a number of mental states. Thus, we can separate between dispositional and occurrent beliefs, dispositional and occurrent desires, and dispositional and occurrent moral judgments, and so on.
In the present discussion, this distinction is most relevant when applied to desires.​[14]​ First, a desire might be understood to consist in a dispositional desire—a desire a person has over a period of time and which might be activated in the form of corresponding occurrent desires at particular moments if certain relevant conditions are satisfied. A dispositional desire constitutes a person’s general tendency to perform a certain type of action; the person in question might have such a desire even though she does not have the corresponding occurrent desire at a given moment. Second, a desire might be understood to consist in an occurrent desire—a desire that takes the form of an episodic mental event which a person has at a particular moment when the relevant conditions are satisfied. On the standard view, it is a person’s occurrent desires which exercise causal influence on her conduct at certain moments in time and which partly explain her actions. To illustrate, consider a mother who desires to help her son to stop taking drugs. She has a dispositional desire to this effect even when she is, say, asleep and it does not exercise any causal influence on her conduct. She has an occurrent desire to this effect when her dispositional desire manifests itself in action—for instance when she calls her son and tries to persuade him to quite the drugs. Moreover, she might have this occurrent desire even when it does not manifest itself in action, but when it nevertheless exercises causal influence on her. For instance, this might happen when she does not call her son, but would have done so if she had not, at that time, had a stronger occurrent desire to do something else, such as attend a vital meeting at work. 
A dispositional state is activated in the form of an occurrent state only when the relevant stimulus conditions are present. This means that in order for expressivists to make use of this distinction, normal conditions cannot be assumed to include stimulus conditions. If they were, the claim that a person who judges that she ought to  (in the sense of holding a dispositional judgment to this effect) is motivated to  (in the sense of having an occurrent desire to ) only in normal conditions would be of no help to expressivists seeking to respond to problem cases in which moral judgment and motivation come apart.​[15]​ It might be asked how we are to understand the distinction between stimulus conditions and normal conditions. Fortunately, for the present purposes it is sufficient to have an intuitive grasp of it. Presumably, stimulus conditions typically consist in factors that are external to a person, where these factors issue in mental states which in turn result in a dispositional state being activated in the form of an occurrent state. And, presumably, normal conditions typically consist in the absence of certain mental deficiencies of the kind mentioned above. 

3. RECONSIDERING EXPRESSIVISM AND INTERNALISM
It is widely recognized in metaethics that internalist claims can vary according to a number of dimensions. However, in what follows a dimension of variability that has attracted very little attention to date will be considered: internalist claims vary over whether moral judgments and motivational states are understood as dispositional states or occurrent states. That is, both of the key phrases referring to a mental state in characterizations of internalism—i.e. “S judges that she ought to ” and “S is motivated to ”—can be understood to refer either to a dispositional state or to an occurrent state. This means that different versions of internalism are potentially available. It can be anticipated that this dimension of variability will have important implications for the plausibility of various versions of internalism. In this paper, the focus is on its consequences for expressivist renderings of internalism, but it might have significance for other metaethical views as well.
According to expressivism, a moral judgment consists in a desire of some kind. We saw above that expressivists should accept internalism which says that, necessarily, if a person judges that she ought to , then she is motivated to , at least in certain conditions. The conjunction of these views entails that, according to expressivism, it is the desire the moral judgment consists in that explains her motivation. In other words, expressivists are committed to reading internalism as a doctrine asserting that what explains a person’s motivation to  is the desire her moral judgment consists in. We saw in the last section that there is a general distinction between mental states understood as dispositional states and occurrent states. Importantly, this distinction means that expressivists are committed to versions of internalism wherein the phrases “S judges that she ought to ” and “S is motivated to ” are understood in a similar way. That is, if a person’s moral judgment is thought of as consisting in a dispositional moral judgment, which on expressivism consists in a dispositional desire, then she is motivated in the sense of having a dispositional desire. Correspondingly, if a person’s moral judgment is thought of as consisting in an occurrent moral judgment, which on expressivism consists in an occurrent desire, then she is motivated in the sense of having an occurrent desire. It might help at this point to indicate dispositional states and occurrent states by attaching the subscript “D” and “O” to the relevant terms (e.g. “judge,” “judgment,” “desire,” and “non-cognitive state”).
We can now set out three expressivist ways of understanding moral judgments; and corresponding to these, three expressivist versions of internalism.
	(i) If a person S judgesD that she ought to , i.e. holds a dispositional judgment to this effect, which according to expressivism consist in a desireD in relation to , S is motivated to  in the sense of having a desireD to , i.e. a dispositional desire to . Thus, expressivists are committed to the following version of UI:

Unconditional Internalism about Dispositional States (UIDD): Necessarily, for any person S and any action , if S judgesD that she ought to , then S is motivated to  in the sense of having a desireD to .

(ii) If a person S judgesO that she ought to , i.e. holds an occurrent judgment to this effect, which according to expressivism consists in a desireO in relation to , S is motivated to  in the sense of having a desireO to , i.e. an occurrent desire to . Expressivists are therefore committed to the following version of UI as well:
Unconditional Internalism about Occurrent States (UIOO): Necessaril​y, for any person S and any action , if S judgesO that she ought to , then S is motivated to  in the sense of having a desireO  to .​[16]​

We can now see that it is not correct, as some expressivists seem to maintain, that they are not committed to UI but only to CI. However, there is a version of CI that is available to expressivists.
(iii) If a person S judgesD that she ought to , i.e. holds a dispositional judgment to this effect, which according to expressivism consists in a desireD in relation to , S is motivated to  in the sense of having a desireO to , i.e. an occurrent desire to , granted that S finds herself in the relevant stimulus conditions and in conditions C, e.g. normal conditions. Thus, expressivists might adopt the following version of CI:

Conditional Internalism about Dispositional and Occurrent States (CIDO): Necessarily, for any person S in the relevant stimulus conditions and normal conditions, and for any action , if S judgesD that she ought to , then S is motivated to  in the sense of having a desireO to .

Advocates of expressivism can adopt CIDO because from the fact that a person judgesD that she ought to , in the form of having a desireD in relation to , it does not follow that she has a desireO to  on this view. This only follows if the relevant stimulus conditions obtain and the conditions are normal. It might be thought that CIDO enables expressivists to reply to the objection that a person’s moral judgment and her motivation may come apart if she suffers from, say, depression. They are in a position to maintain that a person S can judgeD that she ought to  without being motivated to , in the sense of having a desireO to , even if the relevant stimulus conditions are present, if the other relevant conditions are not normal because S is, say, depressed. 
It is important to see that a version of CI which reads both “S judges that she ought to ” and “S is motivated to ” as occurrent states is not available to expressivists. That is, the following view is not available to expressivists: a person judgesO that she ought to  but does not have a desireO to  because the conditions are not normal. First, we have seen that expressivists are committed to UIOO. We saw above that expressivists have to read internalism as saying that a person’s moral judgment consists in a desire and that it is this desire which explains her motivation to do what she judges that she ought to do. This means that if a person judgesO that she ought to , then she is motivated to  in the sense of having a desireO to . Second, as regards a person’s desireO to  it is not meaningful to maintain that the relevant desire fails to be activated as a desireO to  on grounds that the conditions are not normal. Clearly, since the person in question has a desireO to , it cannot be the case that she does not have a desireO to  because the conditions are not normal, or for any other reason. 

4. THE EXPLANATORY FAILURE OF EXPRESSIVISM
We are now in the position to see that expressivists are unable to account for important cases where the connection between moral judgments and motivation is broken. 
The first type of case. A person judgesD that she ought to  but does not have a desireO to . The subclass of cases that are relevant here is those in which a person judgesD that she ought to  but does not have a desireO to  even though the relevant stimulus conditions are present. It might be thought that expressivists can explain such cases by appealing to CIDO and its reference to normal conditions. However, it is doubtful that a sense can be given to “normal condition” which makes it possible for expressivists to employ CIDO in such explanations. Richard Joyce has drawn attention to the following example: two persons whose “minds were one some other matter” rush from a discussion about whether it is right of Britain to keep the Elgin marbles. In leaving, one of them says “The marbles belong to the Greeks, and keeping them is wrong!” Joyce argues convincingly that we would not conclude that the person does not think that it is wrong of Britain to keep the marbles even if “at the moment of utterance” she has not “activated some particular kind of attitudinal/emotional state” because she is temporarily absent-minded.​[17]​ According to expressivism, we cannot ascribe a moral judgmentO to her since she lacks the relevant non-cognitive stateO. Consequently, expressivists need to ascribe a moral judgmentD to her so as to preserve the assumption that she thinks that the action in question is wrong, even if she does not have the corresponding non-cognitive stateO. 
In such cases, the relevant stimulus conditions are present, as they clearly are in Joyce’s example where the person in question is discussing the moral subject matter at issue. Hence, expressivists are obliged to explain why she does not have the non-cognitive stateO in question by insisting that the other conditions referred to in CIDO are not normal. Thus, they must say that a momentary absent-mindedness is an example of a case where the conditions are not normal.​[18]​
There seem to be two main ways in which expressivists can specify the normal conditions in CIDO: in statistical or in normative terms. In the first alternative, a person who judgesD that she ought to  but has no desireO to  finds herself in an unusual state of mind. However, this is hardly credible in cases of absent-mindedness, since this phenomenon is quite common.​[19]​ In the second alternative, a person who judgesD that she ought to  but does not desireO to , is in some defective state of mind. The kinds of mental state expressivists usually appeal to, and which they take to explain the absence of moral motivation, characteristically consist in addiction, apathy, compulsion, and depression, and so on. Let us grant that these mental states are defective in the required sense, and that they can be distinguished from other mental states that are not thus defective. However, it is difficult to see how this line of thought would avail in cases of absent-mindedness. The main problem is this: once absent-mindedness is categorized as defective, it becomes difficult to avoid categorizing as defective similar states of mind which do not affect the relation between moral judgments and motivation. If absent-mindedness is categorized in this way, it seems difficult to deny that a momentary loss of a sense of humor or aesthetic insensitivity, say, should not be categorized in this way as well. But now, if expressivists have to categorize these further states of mind as defective, the fact that the conditions are not normal will fail to explain why a person who judgesD that she ought to  does not have a desireO to . 
It seems, then, that expressivists need to specify a sense of “normal conditions,” in terms of defectiveness, which successfully categorizes certain innocent states of mind (absent-mindedness) as defective in the relevant sense, but which does not categorize other, equally innocent states of mind (momentary loss of humor, aesthetic insensitivity) in that way. However, it is extremely difficult to see that it would be possible to draw such a fine line between these mental states in a non-circular manner.
The second type of case. A person judgesO that she ought to  but does not have a desireO to . Cases of this kind, which are more closely connected with the main issue of the present paper, will constitute counterexamples to UIOO.
Consider an example: a mother judgesO that she ought to help her son stop using drugs, but since she is deeply depressed she is not motivated, in the sense of having a desireO, to help him. The discussion in the last section entails that expressivists are unable to account for such cases since they are committed to UIOO. If a person’s judgment to the effect that she ought to  consists in a judgmentO, expressivists have to say that she is motivated to  in the sense of having a desireO to . This means that if we do not take her to have a desireO to , we cannot ascribe to her a judgmentO to the effect that she ought to . Moreover, we saw that there is no version of CI available to expressivists which treats both “S judges that she ought to ” and “S is motivated to ” as occurrent states.
However, it appears that it is cases of this kind that Gibbard and other expressivists are setting out to explain when they appeal to the notion of normal conditions. In the second passage excerpted above, Gibbard starts by considering a version of internalism according to which “if you think you ought to do it right now, you’ll be moved to do it at least to some degree.” This indicates that he has a judgmentO in mind.​[20]​ He then imagines a counterexample to this thesis where someone is convinced that she ought to perform an action but has “no inclination whatsoever to do so.” As the thesis under consideration concerns a judgmentO, the motivational state in question needs to be understood as a desireO. Gibbard responds by maintaining that a moral judgment consists in a state of mind that “normally issues in action.” This suggests, as we have seen, that a moral judgment consists in a judgmentD which issues in a desireO only when conditions are normal. Moreover, he suggests that if a moral judgment does not, at a particular moment, make you “tend to do what you plan to do” (which appears to refer to a desireO), you are “abnormal.” So it seems that, in reply to the counterexample, Gibbard adopts a version of internalism corresponding to CIDO. 
It can now be seen that Gibbard’s defense of expressivism fails. First, expressivists cannot exchange UIOO for CIDO as Gibbard appears to suggest. As we observed above, expressivists are committed to UIOO, and the fact that they can adopt CIDO as well cannot change this fact. Second, CIDO does nothing to help expressivists avoid the kind of counterexample under discussion. It is directed against a version of internalism according to which a person who judges that she ought to perform an action “right now” is motivated to perform it at that particular moment, i.e. an internalist claim which corresponds to UIOO. Internalism in the form of CIDO does not allow expressivists to avoid such counterexamples, since it concerns the relation between a moral judgment, understood as a judgmentD, and motivation understood as a desireO. It may be that Gibbard does not see this because he does not clearly appreciate the importance of the distinction between dispositional and occurrent mental states to the present issue and, as a result, does not realize that this distinction results in different versions of internalism. As a consequence, perhaps, he does not realize that expressivists are committed to UIOO, even if they can adopt CIDO as well, and that expressivists therefore cannot adopt CIDO in response to the kind of counterexample he considers.
The basic point of the preceding discussion is that expressivists cannot avoid the objection being considered by appealing to the notion of normal conditions. Nevertheless, it might be asked if there are any cases of the second type. If there are none, it might be suggested that expressivists can argue that, although Gibbard’s defense is unsuccessful, this does not matter since no cases require the defense he seeks to provide.
Closer consideration of the matter suggests that this speculation is bound to be fruitless. Return to the example we started with. Assume that the mother thinks that she ought to help her son stop using drugs and that she thinks this at a particular moment, in which case it is a judgmentO. However, assume that she is very depressed as a result of her son’s drug problems. It seems perfectly possible to imagine her failing to be motivated to help her son at that particular moment, in the sense of having any desireO to do so; and it seems possible that the explanation is her depressed state of mind. It should be recalled that expressivism, as understood here, is a claim about the meaning of moral sentences. As a consequence, since cases of this type seem conceivable, expressivists cannot just deny that they constitute a difficulty for their view.
Moreover, there are circumstances in which, plausibly, events of this kind actually take place. We considered earlier an example where a person utters a moral sentence but does not hold the corresponding judgmentO because she is momentarily absent-minded. According to expressivism, we might then ascribe a moral judgmentD to her. However, in most cases where a person makes a moral utterance we take her to hold the corresponding judgmentO, given that she is sincere and not mistaken about her own states of mind.​[21]​ Consider a mother who says “I really ought to help my son stop using drugs.” Assume that we consider her to be sincere and not mistaken about her own view regarding what she ought to do. However, suppose that we know that she is deeply depressed as a result of her son’s drug problems and, furthermore, that she does not show any inclination to help her son at that point in time. Here we would presumably be inclined to accept that her utterance expresses a judgmentO to the effect that she ought to help her son, although she is not motivated to do so in the sense of having a desireO, and that this is explained by her depressed state of mind.
The third type of case. A person judgesD that she ought to  but does not have a desireD to . A case of this kind would be a counterexample to UIDD.
Let us first recall that expressivists agree that there might be cases where a person judgesD that she ought to  without being motivated to , in the sense of having a desireO to . This might happen when the person in question suffers from a mental condition such as depression. Let us next observe that a person’s mental condition might influence her desiresD and not just her desiresO. Thus, it is a common observation that a person who is, say, severely depressed might become less disposed to do what she uses to do and not just abstain from doing these things at particular moments. Moreover, it appears that a person’s mental condition can cause some of her dispositional states to go out of existence while others remain intact. For example, someone who endures an overwhelming depression might cease to want to do certain things which she wanted to do before her illness, although these wants might return if she recovers. Furthermore, it seems that if a person’s desireD to perform a certain type of actions goes out of existence, this can have the consequence that her desireO to perform such actions also goes out of existence. For example, if a person’s dispositional desire to help people in trouble ceases to exist as a result of her severe depression, her occurrent desire to perform such actions might disappear with it.
Thus, assume (a) that a person can judgeD that she ought to  without having a desireO to  if she suffers from a certain mental condition, such as deep depression; and (b) that a person’s mental condition can cause one of her desiresD to go out of existence with the consequence that she does not have the corresponding desireO. It then seems (c) that it is possible that a person might judgeD that she ought to  without being motivated to  in the sense of having a desireO to , and that the explanation of this is that her mental condition (e.g. depression) has eliminated her desireD to . In other words, it seems that a person might judgeD that she ought to  and that the explanation of why she lacks a desireO to  is that her desireD to  has ceased to exist as a result of her mental condition. This reasoning suggests that UIDD is mistaken, since it entails that a person can judgeD that she ought to  without having a desireD to .
It is arguable, moreover, that reasoning of this sort explains certain extreme cases. Suppose the mother who has a son with drug problems says “I really ought to help my son stop using drugs.” Assume, further, that we take her to be sincere and not mistaken about her own mental states—among other things because we know how much she loves her son and have witnessed the many sacrifices she has made for him in the past. In that case, the mother certainly appears to judgeD that she ought to help her son. (As we saw above, we might also want to say that she judgesO that she ought to help her son, but that is not relevant in the present type of case.) Let it be imagined that she also confides to us that she is so depressed that she has no energy left to actually help her son and that this confession is confirmed by her behavior, since for quite a while she has shown no signs of trying to help him. In other words, we think that, because of her severe depression, she has no desireO to help her son. A possible explanation of her lack of desireO seems to be this: her deep depression has, at least temporarily, caused her desireD to help her son to go out of existence. So, although we think that she judgesD that she ought to help her son to quit drugs, we also think that she does not have any desireO to do so, on the ground that she does not have any desireD to this effect—the latter being, in turn, a result of her depressed state of mind. Thus, she judgesD that she ought to help her son stop using drugs, but she does not have a desireD to do so. It follows that UIDD is mistaken.
Moreover, given the reasoning above expressivists owe us an explanation of why we should regard this type of cases as categorically impossible. (Again, it should be recalled that expressivism, as understood here, is a claim about the meaning of moral sentences.) The conceivability of the scenarios set out above seems to suggest that expressivists do indeed face this explanatory demand. However, it is difficult to see that they could provide the necessary explanation in any other way than by simply postulating that a person’s judgmentD to the effect that she ought to  consists in a desireD which motivates her to —which, obviously, would beg the question.

5. CONCLUSION
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^16	  It might be objected that expressivists can deny UIOO. As expressivism is understood here, it says that a sentence such as “I ought to ” expresses a desire in relation to . However, it might be argued that from the fact that a person has a desire in relation to  it does not follow that she is motivated to . In particular, a person’s moral judgment to the effect that she ought to  might consist in a complex desire, e.g. a second order desire to have a desire to , and this is compatible with her not having a desire to . This objection is misguided for two reasons. First, as stressed above, expressivists embrace internalism because this view seems able to account for the close connection between a person’s judgment that she ought to  and her motivation to perform  herself. Accordingly, expressivists as Gibbard and Blackburn explicitly advocate internalism thus understood and expressivists are generally considered internalists in this sense. Indeed, as already indicated, if expressivists do not accept such a version of internalism, a basic rationale for their view is lost. Second, assuming that there are expressivists who would not embrace UIOO as formulated here, it is plausible to suppose that they would accept a slightly different version of this view: Necessarily, for any person S and any action , if S judgesO that she ought to , then S is motivated to see to it that , in the sense of having a desireO to see to it that . For example, even if a person who holds a moral judgment in the form of a complex desire in relation to  need not be motivated to  herself, she is motivated to see to it that , for instance by supporting others to . It would then be possible to direct the same argument against this internalist claim as is directed against UIOO below, although it would complicate the examples made use of there. Similar considerations apply to UIDD.
^17	  Joyce 2002, pp. 341, 342. Joyce makes this observation as a part of an entirely different argument. For discussion of Joyce’s argument, see Ridge 2006b, pp. 503–504.
^18	  It is not difficult to imagine cases which parallel Joyce’s example but concern the expressivist view about the connection between moral judgments and desires.
^19	  See e.g. Stocker 1979, p. 744. For arguments indicating that the normality condition should be understood, not statistically, but normatively, see e.g. Kauppinen (forthcoming), p. 8, n. 13. Cf. Dreier 1990, p. 11. 
^20	  Italics added.
^21	  See Ridge 2006b, esp. pp. 503–504.  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